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Ever since the blueprints for monetary union in Europe were first drawn
up, the United States, considered as a collection of individual states or
regions, has served as a benchmark for assessing its feasibility and
evaluating alternative policy options. Starting with Robert Mundell’s
seminal 1961 article on optimal currency areas, countless papers have
explored the inner workings of US labour, product and capital markets,
and of its public finances, in the hope of learning lessons for Europe. 
It could be argued that this US inspiration is mistaken. After all, it is not
the only economic and monetary federation in the world. Other federa-
tions work on different principles – especially when it comes to public
finances – and there is no guarantee that US arrangements are optimal
– especially, again, regarding public finances. But we know the US
better and we think we understand it better, so success or failure rela-
tive to the US test carries much more weight than with the Australian,
Canadian, Indian or Swiss tests. For better or worse, the US remains our
ultimate policy laboratory.
This essay on US fiscal federalism by Randall Henning and Martin
Kessler builds on the established tradition. But unlike many papers
that take current US features as a given, they tell us what present
arrangements governing responsibility over public debt gradually
emerged from, and why. By bringing in the historical dimension and the
trial-and-error process that took place over more than two centuries,
they help us understand the logic behind alternative arrangements and
why the current one has in the end prevailed.Their careful historical account yields several important lessons. It first
recalls that the US system as we know it, with its combination of a large
federal budget responsible for the bulk of public debt and limited thrifty
state budgets subject to balanced budget rules, emerged gradually
from a sequence of events; in fact the initial set-up, as designed and
enforced by Alexander Hamilton, was almost exactly the opposite.
Second, it makes clear that beyond economic principles, attitudes
towards what was in the aftermath of independence called the
‘assumption’ of state debt were shaped by broader political considera-
tions – not least the aim of building a genuine federal government.
Third, it explains how after the US was firmly established as a federa-
tion, changing political conditions led to a reversal of the federal
government’s stance and to the enforcement of a ‘no bail-out’ principle.
An intriguing feature of US history is therefore that the competences
and features of federal government grew out of its assumption of state
debt, and that the centre imposed a de-facto no bail-out regime only
after having assumed essential powers.
Another interesting observation by Henning and Kessler is that balanced
budget rules were adopted spontaneously by states in response to finan-
cial stress and defaults, rather than as a disciplinary device mandated by
the centre. Thus, there is still significant variability between states
regarding the modus operandi and strictness of budget rules. The ques-
tion remains if what matters is the strictness of the rule, or deeper
political preferences at state level, of which the rule is only an expression.
Finally, as Henning and Kessler emphasise, a no less important lesson
for Europe is that policy principles and institutions should be looked at
as a system rather than in isolation. As the authors point out, it may
seem obvious to recall that states in the US can abide by strict budget
balance rules to the extent the federal government is responsible for
stabilisation and the bail-out of insolvent banks, but this simple lesson
is sometimes overlooked in European discussions.
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director, Bruegel
Brussels, January 2012
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US HISTORY FOR ARCHITECTS OF EUROPE’S FISCAL UNION
INTRODUCTION
1
However the euro area navigates its immediate financial crisis, funda-
mental reform of fiscal governance – institutions, rules, and
procedures – will remain a central part of its long-term agenda. The
relationship between the monetary union and its member states is at
the heart of the debate. The European Council in December 2011 decid-
ed on a ‘fiscal compact’ for the euro area that includes the adoption of
a new rule restricting deficits by member states in their constitutions
or framework laws – ‘debt brakes’. This measure complements an array
of other provisions to prevent the emergence of large fiscal deficits and
strengthen the sanctions for rule violations. Debate continues over
whether the euro area must create a deeper fiscal union, including the
introduction of joint and several responsibility for bonds. 
These debates about Europe’s future often reference the historical
experience of the United States. Some salient features of US fiscal fed-
eralism that are frequently addressed in the literature on European
monetary integration include the (i) transfers that take place between
the federal government and the states, (ii) absence of federal bailouts
of the states, and (iii) limitations on the deficits of the individual states
and their correspondingly low debt.
This essay briefly reviews American fiscal history in light of questions
confronting the future of fiscal union in the euro area. We draw lessonsfor the dilemmas that Europe faces and point readers to particularly
illuminating episodes and references in the literature on the United
States. The fact that states encountered major debt crises and default-
ed, yet the union managed to overcome them intact, points to relevant
lessons for European policymakers in the current turmoil. There is a
deep and varied literature and we have not exhausted it; but we believe
that readers will be well rewarded by referring to the contributions
listed here. Focusing on the problem of how to grapple with dysfunc-
tional members of a union, and placing the financial challenge in
political and historical context, this essay is a hybrid of analytical inter-
pretation and literature review. The euro area will not want to replicate
US institutions, but will want to bear in mind the lessons from US suc-
cesses and mistakes when redesigning its own institutions. We
consider first the key phases in US fiscal history, and then examine
issues and lessons relating to balanced budget rules that have been
adopted by the states.
US FISCAL HISTORY IN A NUTSHELL
The fiscal history of the US federal government and its relationship to
state and local governments can be assessed in five phases or
episodes: (1) Alexander Hamilton’s reforms immediately after the
establishment of the new federal government under the US
Constitution in 1789; (2) state defaults during the 1840s; (3) a series
of defaults at state and local level after the Civil War; (4) the Great
Depression of the 1930s; and (5) scattered municipal defaults
between 1970-2010. We consider each in turn, devoting somewhat
disproportionate attention to the early, formative period.
Hamilton’s plan
The first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, has been cred-
ited with creating a modern financial system for the new United States
2.
The magnitude of his achievements becomes clear when the prior con-
dition of the US economy is considered. Before 1790, the United States
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the Revolutionary War, and had no banking system, regularly
functioning securities markets or national currency
3. The federal gov-
ernment was reliant on the thirteen states to collect and share tax
revenue, and was unable to pay war veterans or to service, let alone
redeem, debts. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal govern-
ment had no executive branch, judicial branch or tax authority. As an
‘institutional equilibrium’, the United States were decidedly unstable
and the financial predicament largely drove the constitutional reform of
1787 in Philadelphia. 
After George Washington was inaugurated as President in April 1789,
and Hamilton was confirmed, the new treasury secretary began to pro-
pose a series of institutional innovations on which he had been
cogitating for at least a decade. Based on the secretary’s study of
British and Dutch financial institutions, these proposals included the
establishment of the Bank of the United States, the mint, securities
markets, and, most interestingly for our purposes, the assumption of
state debts by the federal government. These were to be complementa-
ry, mutually reinforcing elements of the new American financial
architecture. He delivered the first of his blueprints in the form of the
Report on Public Credit to Congress in January 1790 (Chernow, 2004,
pp297-306; Hamilton, vol. 6, Report on Public Credit).
The debt assumption plan involved the transfer of state debt to the
federal government in the amount of $25 million. Added to existing
federal debt owed to foreign governments (France) and domestic
investors, amounting to $11.7 million and $42.1 million respectively,
federal debt would then amount to $79.1 million (Sylla, 2011) – a very
large sum compared to nominal GDP in 1790, which is estimated at
$187 million. In at least three prolonged debates over the course of
1790 and 1791, opponents in Congress levelled several arguments
against the various elements of the plan. They objected that it (1)
would reward speculators who had purchased debt from (distressed)
original investors; (2) was unfair, as some states (such as
Massachusetts and South Carolina) would be relieved of greater bur-
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7dens than others (such as Virginia and North Carolina); and (3) would
empower the federal executive at the expense of Congress and the
states. 
Thomas Jefferson, who reluctantly served as Secretary of State in
Washington’s first administration, levelled particular criticism at the
Bank of the United States, which Hamilton proposed should help
manage the assumed federal debt, hold federal tax receipts and provide
intermediation. Only three banks existed in 1789 and state govern-
ments served as financial intermediaries (Savage, 1988, p99). The
Bank of the United States was to be capitalised at $10 million – sever-
al times larger than the combined capital of existing banks – with $8
million held by the private sector and $2 million held by the US govern-
ment. The federal government’s share was to be paid in Treasury
securities, as would three-quarters of the private share, thus harness-
ing the assumption plan to the development of the new financial
system. Jefferson argued strenuously that the bank, not specifically
provided for at the Philadelphia convention, was unconstitutional.
Hamilton addressed these objections systematically, arguing against
‘discrimination’ between the original and present holders of debt on the
grounds not only of fairness but also that it was essential for an effi-
cient, unified securities market. He justified ‘assumption’ on the
grounds that state debt was issued for a common purpose: to prose-
cute the War and secure independence. He defended the
constitutionality of his proposals by arguing that, even though the
Constitution did not mention the establishment of a new bank, the
authority to do so was implied by granting the executive the responsi-
bility for the financial affairs of the federal government – the ‘implied
powers doctrine’, which became a permanent feature of US constitu-
tional law (Chernow, 2004, pp344-61).
More fundamentally, Hamilton saw his plan as not simply a way to
secure credit for the federal government, or even to establish a nation-
al financial system, but as a grand political project. He envisaged the
plan as (1) aligning the issuance of debt with the tax base, securing
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base reserved to it under the Constitution (tariffs), (2) securing for the
federal government the allegiance of the holders of federal debt and the
financial system revolving around it, and (3) generally binding the
states to the union (Hamilton, Report on Public Credit).
As part of the plan – and this point is sometimes lost in reviews of this
period – Hamilton restructured the debt. The restructuring applied to
both prior federal debt and the newly assumed state debt. The secre-
tary adopted a menu approach to debt exchange of (a) a bond paying 6
percent, equal to the previous rate, (b) a bond paying 3 percent, and
(c) one paying 6 percent but on which interest was deferred for ten
years. He sweetened the offer by providing call protection (the Treasury
could not withdraw bonds when the interest rate fell) and a sinking
fund to assure repayment (Sylla and Wilson, 1999; Ratchford, 1941,
pp52-72; McGrane, 1935). Investors were offered a swap of old debt for
a combined package of the three new bonds, on a voluntary basis. The
new bonds were perpetual, without a redemption date, on the model of
British consols. By the time Hamilton left office in early 1795, 98 per-
cent of domestic (federal and state) debt had been exchanged on these
terms. Foreign debt, mainly to France, was repaid in full, with accrued
interest, with the proceeds of a new loan from Dutch bankers (Sylla,
2011, pp11-13).
The implementation of the assumption plan quickly became embroiled
in distributional conflict among the states. The federal government
assumed $18.3 million in state debt in 1790 and charged the states
accordingly through accounts that were to be settled in order to
equalise the per capita costs of financing the Revolutionary War. The
creditor states ended up being owed $3.5 million by the debtor states
and were issued this amount in new federal bonds plus another $0.5
million to cover interest arrears, raising total state debt assumed to
$22.5 million. The debtor states were forgiven the corresponding bal-
ances that they owed
4. Albert Gallatin, who served as treasury
secretary in the Jefferson and Madison administrations, argued that
Hamilton assumed $10.9 million more of state debt than would have
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assumption. Hamilton defended the sequencing as important for avoid-
ing a conflict between the state and federal levels over the tax base,
which, with the exception of import tariffs, was subject to the concur-
rent jurisdiction of the two levels
5.
The contemporary debate over monetary union in Europe appears polite
compared to the ferocity with which Hamilton’s plan was debated in
Congress. The assumption plan was rejected once by Congress and
then stitched into a famous compromise relocating the seat of govern-
ment from New York to the District of Columbia. But the debate
effectively reopened the fragile constitutional compromise of 1787
over the balance to be struck between the states and the union, and
between Congress and the executive
6. The politics around these issues
were so vituperative in spring 1790 that, in Chernow’s (2004, p326)
assessment, it would not have been far-fetched to think that the union
could break up
7. As it was, the episode crystallised opposing forces in
American politics and forced the irreconcilable split between the
‘Federalists’, led by Hamilton, and the ‘Democratic Republicans’, led by
Jefferson and James Madison, that was to define American politics for
decades (Chernow, 2004, pp320-331). The Bank of the United States
became the primary battlefield for this ongoing factional conflict
8.
Establishing the ‘no-bailout’ norm in the 1840s
Although a critical part of the US financial system, the debt assumption
of 1790 set a precedent that endured for several decades. The federal
government assumed the debt of states again after the War of 1812
and then for the District of Columbia in 1836. During this period, the
possibility of a federal bailout of states was a reasonable expectation;
moral hazard was substantially present. This pattern was broken in the
1840s, when eight states plus Florida, then a territory, defaulted.
Hamilton had wanted to make the federal government the sole creditor
of the states with the assumption plan (Rodden, 2006, p57), but was
unsuccessful. With the exception of the War of 1812, states issued
10
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respondingly few taxes. Land sales, bank charters and various
investments were the main sources of state revenue, and the role of
state government was quite limited. Westward expansion during the
1820s and 1830s, however, gave rise to demands for infrastructure,
such as canals and turnpikes – which could only be financed through
borrowing. This borrowing was done on the theory that debt would be
serviced and repaid by tolls and other project revenue, without raising
taxes, dubbed ‘taxless finance’ (Wallis, 2005). The Erie Canal was one
of the first and most financially successful of these projects. With the
financial panic of 1837 and recession of 1839-43, however, much of
the debt incurred became unserviceable.
The indebted states petitioned Congress to assume their debts, citing
the multiple precedents. British and Dutch creditors, who held 70 per-
cent of the debt on which states later defaulted, pressed the federal
government to cover the obligations of the states. They argued that the
federal government’s guarantee, while not explicit, had been implied.
Even the prices of bonds of financially sound states fell, and the federal
government was cut off from European financiers in 1842. In that year,
Lord Ashburton, the main British negotiator for Barings, wrote that the
United States was an “ungovernable and unmanageable anarchy”
(Roberts, 2010). John Quincy Adams evidently believed that another
war with Britain was likely if state debts were not assumed by the
federal government
9.
However, on this occasion Congress rejected the assumption petition
and was able to do so for several reasons. First, debt had been issued
primarily to finance locally beneficial projects, rather than national
public goods. Second, domestically held bonds were not a large part of
the US banking portfolio, and default had limited contagion effects, at
least through this particular channel. Third, the financially sound states
were more numerous than the deeply indebted ones. And, finally, the US
economy had matured to the point where it was less dependent on for-
eign capital. Foreign loans were crucial to Hamilton’s plan in 1790, but
they were a minority contribution when investments eventually
11
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resumed in the 1850s (McGrane, 1935, pp21-40; Savage, 1988,
pp105-118; Wibbels, 2003; Wallis, 2005).
Eventually, most states repaid all or most of their debt as a condition
for returning to the markets. The State of Maryland provides a good
example. It had financed the construction of the Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which competed with the canal
project, and a number of other railroads. When state officials were
unable to service the debt with revenues from these projects, they had
no system of direct taxation on which to fall back, and the value of real
property declined quickly. The state suspended payments on bonds
between 1841 and 1847, but resumed payments thereafter, including
accrued interest, and accessed the British market through Barings
again in 1849. The state paid off its pre-crisis debt by 1851 (McGrane,
1935, pp82-101). However, Maryland and the states that had default-
ed returned to markets at a premium, whereas the others were able to
borrow at normal rates relatively soon after the crisis (English, 1996).
The rejection of debt assumption established a 'no bailout' norm on the
part of the federal government. The norm is neither a 'clause' in the US
Constitution nor a provision of federal law. Nevertheless, whereas no
bailout request had been denied by the federal government prior to
1840 (Ratchford, 1941), no such request has been granted since, with
one special exception discussed below. The fiscal sovereignty of states,
the other side of the no-bailout coin, was thereby established.
During the 1840s and 1850s, states adopted balanced budget amend-
ments to their constitutions or other provisions in state law requiring
balanced budgets. This was true even of financially sound states that
had not defaulted. The adoption of balanced budget rules continued
over the course of subsequent decades, so that eventually three-
fourths of the states had adopted such restrictions. Because this is a
direct analogue to the adoption of constitutional ‘debt brakes’ in the
euro area, it is important to understand the political economy of the
adoption of these provisions of the states in the nineteenth century. We
devote a section to this topic below. Suffice to say at this point,US HISTORY FOR ARCHITECTS OF EUROPE’S FISCAL UNION
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however, that several states did not adopt such amendments and in
1860, on the eve of the Civil War, collective state indebtedness stood at
$247.4 million, $67.5 million greater than in 1841. This sum was four
times the size of the federal debt (Savage, 1988, p118).
Reconstruction defaults
After the Civil War, the process of reintegrating the Southern states into
the Union and reviving their economies – ‘Reconstruction’ – witnessed
an extraordinary degree of corruption and political dysfunctionality
10.
“As soon as the military authorities were removed,” writes Ratchford
(1941, p170), “the Reconstruction governments rushed to plunder
public treasuries. Since those treasuries were usually empty and since
the possibilities of taxation were severely limited, the only alternative
was to despoil the public credit”. By the end of Reconstruction in 1874,
the total debt of the eleven Southern states had risen to $247.6 million
from $111.4 million in 1865. Most of it took the form of direct state
bonds or guarantees of railroad company bonds. Ratchford (1941,
p180) estimates that about $12 million of these bonds was sold
abroad. Much of this new debt was regarded as odious by Southern
electorates, imposed by “corrupt and hostile governments supported
by outside military force”
11. Eight states thus repudiated part of their
debt or reduced it by other not-so-voluntary means by $116.3 million
over the next sixteen years.
Although the no-bailout position of the federal government vis à visthe
states had been established prior to the Civil War, the position of the
states themselves vis à vis their counties and cities remained to be
tested. During Reconstruction, many local governments also accumu-
lated debt that they were unable to service during the 1870s. Almost all
of this debt was held abroad or by out-of-state residents – a pattern
facilitated of course by integrated capital markets – and the taxes nec-
essary to repay would have come from upper-income households.
States successfully fended off petitions for bailouts – none were pro-
vided – and all states re-wrote their constitutions to prohibit them
(Inman, 2003, p58 and p65), and several strengthened limits onissuance of their own debt
12. Remarkably, Inman (2003) records only
one instance of state bailout of a municipality (Camden, New Jersey) in
the history of the United States
13.
Great Depression and fiscal shift
The 1930s saw another wave of defaults by local governments and the
last default to be recorded by a state. Between 1920 and 1930 capital
investment by local governments doubled, financed by general obliga-
tion bonds backed by property tax. Owing to the collapse in the tax base
with the Depression, by December 1935 more than 3,200 local govern-
ments had defaulted on $2.4 billion of these debts. This debt was owed
to domestic rather than foreign investors, yet neither state nor federal
bailouts were provided. Instead, massive fiscal shifting took place as
states and the federal government adopted new programmes, taking
over some functions from local government, and provided direct assis-
tance as local government cut spending (Inman, 2003, p59). There
was a complete reversal in the relative shares of total government
spending of the three levels over the course of the Depression. Whereas
in 1932 local governments spent 50 percent, states 20 percent and the
federal government 30 percent of the total, by 1940 local governments
spent 30 percent, states 24 percent, and the federal government 46
percent (Wallis, 1984). The period thus marks the ascendance of the
federal government relative to the states and, notwithstanding
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s instinctive fiscal conservatism, the
introduction of countercyclical demand management at the federal
level. Most of the defaulted debt and interest was repaid in full by 1940
(Inman, 2003, p66). The last state default occurred in 1933 when
Arkansas suspended payments on its highway bonds. By 1943, the
majority of defaulting issues were refinanced and the state returned to
good standing in debt markets (Ang and Longstaff, 2011).
1970-2010: scattered municipal bankruptcies
Over the last several decades, until the 2008-09 crisis, the United
States did not see a wave of bankruptcies but rather a series of
14
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municipal bond issuers defaulted, while between 1988-2009 about
170 jurisdictions declared bankruptcy (Kasparek, 2011, p16). The
case of New York City in 1975 is remembered by the headline in the
New York Daily News, ‘Ford to New York: Drop Dead’. The city’s rescue
was primarily organised by the Governor of New York through the
Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC). When Philadelphia encoun-
tered problems in 1990, the response was organised by the state of
Pennsylvania. The cities of Bridgeport and Miami and Orange County
defaulted. However, the states did not provide funds to repay bondhold-
ers in these cases. The single exception to this rule is the state of New
Jersey, which bailed out the city of Camden (Inman, 2003, p60). The
bankruptcy filing of Jefferson County, Alabama, in November 2011, is
the most recent; it follows the bankruptcy filing by Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, and a couple of other cities
14.
The single exception to the federal government’s no-bailout position is
the case of the District of Columbia in the 1990s, an exception that
proves the rule. In this case, Congress did indeed take control of the
District’s finances, injected funds, and managed the budget for four
years though the District of Columbia Financial Control Board, created
in 1995, which left the city in surplus after four years. This was possi-
ble because of a special clause in the Constitution giving Congress
authority over the administration of the District – authority that does
not extend to the ‘sovereign’ states
15.
In the present crisis, the finances of the states of California and Illinois
have captured attention. Both states have large populations and
economies – 13 percent and 4.5 percent of national GDP respectively
– and have large budget deficits and dysfunctional politics. Both states
also have balanced budget amendments in their state constitutions,
illustrating the leaky character of these provisions
16. The size of these
states and the impact of a default by one of them on US financial mar-
kets have generated speculation about the possibility of a federal
bailout in extremis. While this might be a possibility in the abstract, the
absence of a modern precedent places a high institutional bar on such
15
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domestic political wrangling within both states; their political parties
seem resigned to resolving these issues independently.
BALANCED BUDGET RULES
In light of the provisions being adopted in Europe, three aspects of the
balanced budget rules of the states deserve elaboration: (1) the poli-
tics of their propagation; (2) the exact nature of the requirements and
their variation among the states; and (3) their effectiveness in limiting
deficits. 
Emergence
The adoption of balanced budget rules among most of the states during
the nineteenth century raises a number of interesting questions. What
drove the adoption across disparate states? Did capital markets insist
on them by discriminating between states with provisions and those
without? What role did voters and elections play? Did the federal gov-
ernment promote these rules? The published work casts some light on
these questions; but many questions remain to be addressed by future
research.
The first wave of adoptions among nineteen states between 1842-57 is
closely linked to the financial panic of 1837 and subsequent economic
depression. According to Wallis (2005) and Wallis and Weingast
(2008), the emergence of balanced budget rules should be understood
as the demand of voters for more transparent and realistic financing
rules. All of the states that defaulted in the 1840s except Florida,
Mississippi and Arkansas, wrote some kind of deficit restriction into
their constitution immediately afterward. The point was not so much to
forbid deficits altogether, but to avoid ‘taxless finance’ and other forms
of infrastructure financing which were either not sustainable or easily
led to corruption
17. Quite often, state governments were forced to obtain
public approval by referendum to issue debt for a project and
16
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ted to the Union after the Civil War generally included debt limits in their
constitutions (Ratchford, 1941, p122, whose explanation is consistent
with Wallis and Weingast).
The federal government was passive during the adoption of these pro-
visions by the states. The federal government certainly did not
mandate the adoption of these provisions and it does not appear that it
was promoting them either. Nor does it appear that states pressed for
conformity on the part of their neighbours, or even, by these accounts,
that states were competing against one another for access to lower-
cost financing by adopting them. Existing treatments suggest that
states were acting autonomously, though the financial challenges were
common, and the political pressures for adoption were internal. By con-
trast, the current adoption of ‘debt brakes’ in the euro area is driven
more by the most dominant member states and the euro-area institu-
tions. But internal support is almost surely necessary for the
meaningful implementation and perpetuation of these rules. The
episode of the 1840s also underscores the importance of crisis as a




Because each state adopted its own balanced budget rule (Vermont is
the only state without such a rule in some form), there is a large varia-
tion in the way these rules function. According to the National
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), which surveyed State
Budget Controllers, 44 states have a constitutional or statutory rule
that requires the governor to submit a balanced budget, 41 require the
legislature to pass a balanced budget, while 37 demand that the gover-
nor signs a balanced budget. Finally, 43 states simply forbid carrying
over a deficit to the next budget plan (annually or biannually). Note
however that different readings of state laws or jurisprudence have led
some academics or institutions to rank the restrictiveness of these pro-
visions differently.
17
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which receives most tax collections and from which most expenditures
are made. Grants and reimbursements from the federal government
make up most of states’ non-general fund: those funds are balanced de
facto because federal grants are earmarked for specific projects, and
the money spent matches the money received. Moreover, most states
have separate operating and capital budgets; bond finance for capital
projects does not fall within most balanced budget rules (NCSL, 2010).
Therefore most balanced budget rules are ‘golden’
19. Note, however, that
unfunded liabilities are often excluded from state debt calculations,
and rules sometimes allow the diversion of revenues from pension
funds to the general fund, aggravating the underfunding of obligations
in the long run.
Finally, it must be noted that, while we have focused on balanced
budget rules, rules that apply specifically to expenditure or taxes also
have a substantial impact on the budget behaviour of states. Some
states, such as California, require a supermajority (or qualified majori-
ty) in the legislature to raise taxes. Poterba and Rueben (2001) show
that such limitations on tax increases tend to raise state bond yields.
Conversely, constraints on the spending side seem to facilitate lower
yields. ‘Rainy day funds’, another common fiscal instrument, allow
states to save and smooth the fiscal path, by saving at the crest of the
business cycle. 
Effectiveness
Balanced budget rules have not prevented states from getting into
fiscal trouble – witness the recent experience of California and Illinois.
On the other hand, the overall debt of states has been reasonably well
contained. In 2009, California’s was less than 8 percent of state GDP,
New York 11.2 percent, and New Jersey 12.1 percent (see Table 1).
Political scientists and economists have tried to untangle the effects of
these provisions from factors such as party control of state govern-
ment, political culture and capital markets (see Poterba 1996;
Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom, 1995, on market discipline; Rose,
18
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1 California:
In 2004, by referendum, California passed Proposition 58, also
called the 'Balanced Budget Act', which reinforced the previous bal-
anced budget rule by constitutional amendment. The specific
provision, now included in the constitution as article IV, section
12(g) states:
“For the 2004–05 fiscal year, or any subsequent fiscal year, the
Legislature may not send to the Governor for consideration, nor may
the Governor sign into law, a budget bill that would appropriate from
the General Fund, for that fiscal year, a total amount that, when com-
bined with all appropriations from the General Fund for that fiscal
year made as of the date of the budget bill’s passage, and the
amount of any General Fund moneys transferred to the Budget
Stabilization Account for that fiscal year pursuant to Section 20 of
Article XVI, exceeds General Fund revenues for that fiscal year esti-
mated as of the date of the budget bill’s passage. That estimate of
General Fund revenues shall be set forth in the budget bill passed by
US HISTORY FOR ARCHITECTS OF EUROPE’S FISCAL UNION
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as % of GDP
2009 2010 2011 2009 2009
Arizona 36.8% 65.0% 39.0% 4.9% 19.4%
California 36.7% 52.8% 20.7% 7.3% 20.2%
Nevada 19.9% 46.8% 54.5% 3.6% 20.7%
Illinois 15.1% 43.7% 40.2% 9.0% 20.3%
New Jersey 18.8% 40.0% 38.2% 12.1% 19.6%
New York 13.2% 38.8% 15.9% 11.2% 26.8%
Table 1: Debt and deficits of ‘problem states’, 2009-11
Source: McNichol, Oliff and Johnson (2011); data for 2011 is estimated from state
sources; Bureau of Economic Analysis for debt data; Census Bureau for state GDP up to
2009. Note: The states selected had the largest deficits in 2010 as a percentage of their
general fund.the Legislature”.
The Act also allows the Governor to proclaim a fiscal emergency in
specified circumstances, and to submit proposed legislation to
address the fiscal emergency; requires the Legislature to stop other
action and act on legislation proposed to address the emergency;
establishes a budget reserve; provides that the California Economic
Recovery Bond Act is for a single object or work; and prohibits any
future deficit bonds. 
2 Illinois:
Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution of Illinois reads:
a) The Governor shall prepare and submit to the General Assembly,
at a time prescribed by law, a State budget for the ensuing fiscal
year. The budget shall set forth the estimated balance of funds
available for appropriation at the beginning of the fiscal year, the
estimated receipts, and a plan for expenditures and obligations
during the fiscal year of every department, authority, public cor-
poration and quasi-public corporation of the State, every State
college and university, and every other public agency created by
the State, but not of units of local government or school districts.
The budget shall also set forth the indebtedness and contingent
liabilities of the State and such other information as may be
required by law. Proposed expenditures shall not exceed funds
estimated to be available for the fiscal year as shown in the
budget.
b) The General Assembly by law shall make appropriations for all
expenditures of public funds by the State. Appropriations for a
fiscal year shall not exceed funds estimated by the General
Assembly to be available during that year.
BRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
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2010, for a general survey). Our bottom line from a review of this liter-
ature is that balanced budget rules probably do have salutary
independent effects on debt accumulation but that interaction with the
political environment and markets is critically important. 
First, there is a great deal of variation in the strictness of rules among
states and more stringent conditions lead to less borrowing. Bohn and
Inman (1996) estimate that a requirement that the budget be bal-
anced at the end of the year reduces the probability of a deficit from 26
percent to 11 percent. The rule has stronger effects when it is inscribed
in the constitution and exceptions require a qualified majority in the
legislature.  Requiring preparation of a balanced budget is easily cir-
cumvented by optimistic economic projections, whereas prohibitions
on carrying over a deficit from one year to the next are effective (see,
Hou and Smith, 2009, who distinguish between ‘political’ and ‘techni-
cal’ provisions, and Mahdavi and Westerlund, 2011).  Enforcement also
varies among states, with Virginia, for example, lacking a binding mech-
anism (NCSL, 2010). In the 26 states in which Supreme Court judges
are elected, rather than nominated by the governor and confirmed by
the legislature, the rules are enforced more strictly and deficits thereby
limited (Bohn and Inman, 1996).
Second, states with stricter rules are better perceived by the market.
Poterba and Rueben (1999) show that weak provisions cost 10 to 15
basis points, when compared to similar states with stricter anti-deficit
rules. In a subsequent paper (Poterba and Rueben, 2001), they show
that unexpected deficits lead to higher yields for states with weak rules
than states with strong rules.
Third, several studies have found the effectiveness of balanced budget
rules to be contingent on the politics within the state, such as unified
party control of both houses of the legislature (Alt and Lowry, 1994)
and unified control of the governorship and legislature (Poterba, 1994,
as cited in Briffault, 1996). Inman (1998) admits that scholarship
cannot rule out the possibility that balanced budget rules are adopted
by states that are fundamentally fiscally conservative and thus haveBRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
22
little independent impact (the endogeneity problem). After reviewing
the literature of the mid-1990s, Briffault (1996, p60) concludes: “It
seems likely that the real importance of a constitutional balanced
budget requirement is that it signals the high value that a state’s polit-
ical culture sets on a balanced budget. A state with such a constitution
may be more likely to balance its budget, but that is less attributable to
the independent force of the legal requirement than to the political
values and tradition that put it in the constitution in the first place”. The
likely effectiveness of balanced budget rules that are adopted by euro-
area member states in the midst of the present crisis should be
assessed in this light.
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION
Because state and local budgets are about 40 percent of total govern-
ment spending in the United States, fiscal policy is effectively shared
by the levels within the federal system. This is often not given due
recognition in the discourse about macroeconomic stabilisation, in
which the role of the federal government is sometimes an exclusive
focus. Balanced budget provisions of the states do not provide for cycli-
cal adjustment of the calculated deficit. These provisions, to the extent
that they are effective, require raising taxes and/or cutting spending
when revenue falls during recessions. The size of this effect can offset
a substantial portion of the countercyclical movement of the federal
budget position. Krugman (2008), for example, refers to the states as
the ‘fifty little Herbert Hoovers’, pursuing fiscal contraction when
Keynesian measures were in order as the United States was sliding into
the ‘Great Recession’.
The conventional wisdom has been that the budget positions of state
and local governments move procyclically in the United States. Poterba
(1994) found strong evidence for this, and that states with stricter bal-
anced budget rules cut spending more than those with looser rules
during recessions. The strength of this finding appears to vary over
time and over the business cycle, with some studies concluding thatUS HISTORY FOR ARCHITECTS OF EUROPE’S FISCAL UNION
23
state and local budgets overall are neutral or even weakly countercycli-
cal (Sorensen, Wu and Yosha, 2001; Hines, 2010). Sorensen and Yosha
(2001) report that state budget positions are countercyclical at the top
of the business cycle but procyclical in recessions. During the Great
Recession and slow recovery, most studies find that state and local
budgets have acted procyclically (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2010;
Follette and Lutz, 2010; and Kasparek, 2011), while some find neutral-
ity (Hines, 2010). These studies agree, however, that in the
aggregate
20, state and local budgets do not help to stabilise the macro-
economy during recessions; that role is played by the federal
government in the United States
21.
Fiscal transfers from the federal government directly into state budg-
ets, to help them fulfil federal mandates and otherwise alleviate budget
pressure, ameliorate the procyclical influence of the states during
downturns
22. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of
2009, for example, provided large amounts of support to the states.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the level of total
grants-in-aid to state and local governments in 2009 was $482 billion,
$70 billion of which came from the stimulus package. Federal support
then rose to $532 billion in 2010, of which $100 billion was accounted
for by ARRA . A large part of the support was directed through Medicaid
to cover the shortfall of revenues at the state level. The rest was either
spent in the education sector or earmarked for various investment proj-
ects (see Table 2). In 2010, according to the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO), 75 percent of the grants to states contained in the
stimulus package were used to finance state deficits rather than fund
new projects. The high-profile protests in mid-Western states during
summer 2011 responded to state expenditure reductions that in large
measure were done in anticipation of the phasing out of federal
stimulus.
In sum, the federal government (1) is the only level that provides sig-
nificant stabilisation during recessions, while the states are likely to be
procyclical, and (2) injects federal money into state programmes
directly. Both roles render the balanced budget rules at the state level24
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more sustainable than they would be in the absence of the federal gov-
ernment and its fiscal system. 
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CONTAGION
US banking and capital markets are another element of the context in
which budget rules operate and in which the states relate to the federal
government on fiscal matters. Consider first the capital markets and
then the organisation of banking, its regulation and restructuring.
State and local government debt in the United States totalled $2.45 tril-
lion at the end of 2010, 16.7 percent of GDP. Of this amount, roughly 40
percent had been issued by states and 60 percent by local entities. This
compared to federal debt held by the public of $9.36 trillion, or 64.4
percent of GDP. Most of the state and local debt is longer than one year,
with an average maturity of over 14 years, issued to finance capital
expenditures; relatively little has been issued to finance current spend-
ing
23. Thus, only 16 percent of outstanding debt is general obligation
bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the issuer; the vast majori-
ty is secured by the revenue stream of infrastructure and other
investment projects. Balanced budget rules thus appear to have been
effective in configuring the composition of state debt and the recourse
of investors. Half of outstanding state debt is accounted for by seven
states – California, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Florida – with California and New York representing
12.9 and 11.7 percent respectively. Most of these bonds are sold
within the US, the interest on them being exempt from federal income
tax. These outstanding obligations comprise the municipal bond
market in the US
24.
Municipal bonds normally trade at a premium relative to US Treasury
securities, owing to the federal tax exemption. From 2005-07, for exam-
ple, the yield on ten-year municipal bonds was roughly one percent
below ten-year Treasury bonds. That relationship was reversed briefly
during the acute phase of the crisis at the end of 2008 and restored in26
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spring 2009, with the spread evaporating at the end of 2010 and
remaining quite narrow through 2011. Shocks in state bond markets
generally do not appear to have substantial consequences for the mar-
kets in Treasury securities and vice versa
25.
Do the markets effectively discriminate among the bonds of different
states? As of late 2011, Standard and Poor’s rates thirteen states AAA,
fourteen states AA+, seventeen states AA, four states AA-, one state
(Illinois) A+ and one state (California) A-
26. Between 2004 and 2007,
when European sovereign bond spreads were nearly eliminated, the
average spread between the Aaa and Bbb state bonds (using Moody’s
ranking) were in the range of 58 to 46 basis points. That spread rose to
207 basis points during the crisis in 2009 and declined somewhat in
2010. Credit default swap (CDS) markets emerged for the bonds of
eleven states during the Great Recession. Yields on California bonds
spiked to 4.55 percent in December 2008, when its CDS rate peaked
over 500, and fluctuated in the neighbourhood of 3 percent thereafter.
Ten-year CDS rates ranged from 288 for California and 284 for Illinois to
about 65 for Texas, Virginia and Maryland in September 2011.
The operation of the US municipal market suggests comparisons to
those of the European sovereign market. Markets seem to have been
more discriminating among the US states than euro-area members
during the quiescent mid-2000s, particularly given the relatively small
differences in the debt load of the states compared to the differences in
those of the euro-area members. Whether the markets’ extreme differ-
entiation of European sovereign bonds between 2010-11 is fully
justified is beyond the scope of this paper, in comparison, the markets’
moderate differentiation among US state bonds seems to be broadly
proportionate to risk
27.
How effectively do US institutional arrangements and market struc-
tures insulate one state from the fiscal mistakes of another, given that
an individual state default might trigger systemic risk? One might
expect that macroeconomic contagion should be much stronger in a
tightly integrated federation such as the US than in a more looselyintegrated one (Auerbach, 2011). However, spillovers in the US munici-
pal market tend not to be of the ‘contagious’ type but of the
‘flight-to-quality’ type. When the large borrowers such as California,
Georgia, Maryland and the City of New York experience problems, other
issuers see their yields fall (Arezki, Candelon and Sy, 2011). Although
contagious linkage is sometimes found, such as between California and
New York bonds, studies using CDS data also generally find that insula-
tion is strong (Ang and Longstaff, 2011).
State bond yields could move more independently than the level of
macroeconomic integration would lead us to expect for several reasons.
First, the existence of a deep and liquid market in US Treasury securi-
ties as a ‘safe haven’ might play a role that has not been sufficiently
investigated. Second, US banks do not seem to transmit shocks to
states as European banks do to European sovereigns, probably owing
to differences in bond ownership and regulatory frameworks (Ang and
Longstaff, 2011). Third, setting fiscal rules independently in each state
and enforcing them internally might isolate deviant behaviour and pro-
tect others, whereas a rule set and enforced centrally (such as the
excessive deficit provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact) might quickly lose credibility when one sovereign
breaches it.
Fundamental characteristics of the US financial system are germane to
the operation of the municipal bond market and to the role of balanced
budget rules. Banks are less important conduits for finance in the
United States than they are in Europe. Only 8.6 percent of state bonds
outstanding were owned by US commercial banks in 2010. Although
state regulation of banks was the norm in earlier periods, US banking
regulation is now far less geographically fragmented than in Europe.
During the savings and loan banking crisis of the 1980s, which had a
strong regional dimension, the federal government took primary
responsibility for the restructuring. During the far larger rescue and
restructuring of the banking system during 2008-10, the states played
very little role. The risk pool is nationwide in the United States and the
bank rescue did not impair the fiscal position or creditworthiness of the
27
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a common regulatory framework, the contrast with the United States
remains stark. 
CONCLUSION: RAMIFICATIONS FOR EUROPE 
We have reviewed US fiscal federalism, from Alexander Hamilton to the
present, to provide insights for the architects of fiscal federalism in
Europe. The US federal government has not bailed out state and local
governments since the early nineteenth century and the no-bailout
norm has been formed politically; there is no clause in the Constitution.
States adopted balanced budget rules of varying strength during the
nineteenth century and these rules seem to be consequential, some-
times as a constraint, sometimes as a signal to capital markets, for
state fiscal policy. 
Balanced budget rules among the states seem to parallel the effort –
adopted at the March 2011 European Council meeting and affirmed at
the December 2011 summit
28 – to introduce constitutional rules or
framework laws, ‘debt brakes’, in the member states of the euro area
29.
The fiscal compact agreed at the December 2011 summit specified
that under these restrictions members’ annual structural deficits
should not exceed 0.5 percent of nominal GDP. Before drawing too heav-
ily on the US experience in concluding that constitutional debt brakes
are a key solution to Europe’s debt problems, however, Europeans
should consider three essential aspects of the context in which the bal-
anced budget rules of the states operate. The US experience suggests
that the particular path through which rules are adopted and enforced
is likely to be critical to their implementation, and that introducing such
rules for euro-area member states should be accompanied by a federal
system of fiscal powers and a common fund for rescuing and recapital-
ising banks. We consider these three caveats in turn.
Within the US federal system, the states are ‘sovereign’ with respect to
debt
30. This sovereignty has two facets. On the one hand, the federal
28
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the states. Although states were responding to similar financial prob-
lems in similar ways, these rules were adopted autonomously and are
implemented independently from the federal government. In modern
parlance, states’ ‘ownership’ of these rules is complete. On the other
hand, states have no recourse to the federal government when they
have difficulty servicing and repaying debt. The federal government
assuages funding problems in current expenditures, such as through
the ARRA of 2009, but these transfers are largely discretionary and do
not relieve state and local governments of debt obligations. 
The American constitutional design is thus very different from what
European leaders envisage for the euro area: debt brakes that are man-
dated by the Union and enforced by the European Commission and the
EU Court of Justice. The difference is likely to be consequential in two
respects. We suspect that local ownership and enforcement make debt
brakes more effective than under central mandates, particularly in the
context of credible no-bailout norms, and that rules that are centrally
mandated are likely to prove to be more brittle than those adopted in a
decentralised fashion. When one state violates the rule, as the experi-
ence with the Stability and Growth Pact demonstrated, its applicability
to other states is less credible. That is less likely to be the case with
rules that have been adopted autonomously. 
We acknowledge that some of the impetus for debt brakes comes from
within euro-area countries. The present crisis could be sufficiently trau-
matic and thus politically transformative to produce an autonomous
reduction in debt tolerance within some of the most afflicted member
states, just as the US states adopted balanced budget rules
autonomously from the federal government in the nineteenth century.
Such an autonomous change in preferences would augur well for the
effectiveness of debt brakes. But the strength of the internal shift in
debt tolerance is uncertain and is likely to vary significantly among
member states. 
The second fundamental caveat is that the federal government’s
29
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relationship with the states must be seen within the context of a broad-
er fiscal union
31. Since Alexander Hamilton’s plan was enacted, federal
debt has been supported by the full system of federal powers, including
a sweeping power to tax
32. The federal government’s role in public
expenditure and taxation is substantial relative to the states. The
theory of optimum currency areas has trained attention on the fiscal
transfers among different regions of the country that are effected
through the federal system of revenue and expenditures as well as
through direct budget support to states and local governments. The
magnitude of these transfers has been significant, though their exact
importance is the subject of some debate.
However, the macroeconomic stabilisation role of the federal govern-
ment is more important than intra-regional transfers in considering the
budget restrictions of the states. Critically, the rigidity brought on by
balanced budget provisions at the state level is facilitated by fiscal flex-
ibility at the federal level. Despite the leakiness of these provisions,
state and local budgets have behaved procyclically during recessions
in the United States. Since the 1930s, the federal budget has helped to
stabilise the national economy in countercyclical fashion. Without this,
state-level restrictions would have been difficult or impossible to sus-
tain. Although automatic stabilisers might play a greater role in some of
the national economies in Europe than in the US states
33, we believe
that creating stringent state-level debt brakes in Europe without a
capacity for countercyclical stabilisation would be a serious mistake. 
Europe faces a choice between designing debt brakes to provide for
countercyclical action at the national level and creating a common
countercyclical fiscal instrument of considerably larger size than the
present EU budget. Each has advantages and disadvantages. Providing
for countercyclical action in national provisions raises problems of
enforcement and coordination with the fiscal stance of other members.
Which institutions would calculate structural budget positions, ensure
that these calculations are unbiased, and provide for consistency
across member states? Creating a common capacity for countercycli-
cal action requires strong political cohesion and robust institutions forthe monetary union. The need for a countercyclical fiscal capacity at
one level or the other is not a new observation, but we believe that it is
an inescapable one, the implications of which have not yet been suffi-
ciently incorporated in European deliberations about the fiscal
architecture.
US banking and capital markets are the third element of the context in
which budget rules operate and the states relate to the federal govern-
ment on fiscal matters. Compared to Europe, banks are less important
conduits for finance relative to capital markets and bank regulation is
less fragmented, being more of a federal responsibility. Stabilising the
banking system, along with stabilising the macroeconomy, has been
the responsibility of the federal government. In the US, the states have
not themselves undertaken large-scale bailouts or recapitalisation of
banks over the last century. As a consequence, the need to stabilise the
banking system did not enter into conflict with balanced budget rules
at the state level. In the euro area, by contrast, harmonisation of bank
regulation is still young, and the fiscal costs of bank rescues and recap-
italisation remain primarily a national responsibility. The introduction
of debt brakes threatens to collide with the need to mount large-scale
rescues of banking systems at the level of member states. As such pro-
visions are put in place, therefore, it is all the more important that the
euro area unifies banking regulation and creates a common pool of
fiscal resources for rescuing, restructuring and recapitalising banks
(Posen and Véron, 2009; Véron, 2011).
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